London and New York City: Governing ungovernable cities
Researcher
Earlier this summer New York State Assembly member Zohran Mamdani became the Democratic Party nominee for mayor of New York City (NYC). He won 56 per cent to Andrew Cuomo’s 44 per cent: a remarkable result given that earlier this year Mamdani was polling at 1 per cent.
No sooner was this result announced than attention turned to the governance constraints he will face. New citywide taxes – such as his proposed additional 2 per cent levy on incomes above $1 million – require New York State approval. Law-making within the city rests with the NYC Council (composed of 51 elected council members): the mayor cannot even introduce bills, let alone approve them, without the Council’s say-so. And successful policy implementation depends on a sprawling landscape of more than 50 city agencies and public authorities.
This speaks to NYC’s ‘ungovernability’, a concept rooted in Douglas Yates' 1970s thesis that urban policymaking struggles because of the inherent complexities of urban environments and governance structures. Fragmentation of authority, finance and implementation results in numerous veto points, making decisive and coordinated action difficult.
London exhibits its own unique form of ‘ungovernability’. Power is split between the Greater London Authority (GLA) – which plays a predominantly strategic role – and 33 local authorities, which deliver most frontline services. The mayor’s fiscal autonomy is incredibly limited by international standards, with almost all tax revenue flowing to Whitehall rather than City Hall. And almost all relevant legislation is firmly the preserve of central government.
Despite their comparable scale and shared governance constrains, NYC has proven more adept than London at cutting through this ‘ungovernability’ thicket.
NYC was ahead of the curve in the late-1990s and early-2000s when it adopted a data-driven approach – initially towards policing before expanding beyond this – which emphasised accountability and outcomes, resulting in a dramatic fall in crime. The recent ‘City of Yes’ zoning overhaul is expected to unlock over 80,000 new homes. Meanwhile, there is greater possibility for city-driven governance reform. Charter Revision Commissions are tasked with suggesting changes to the city’s charter, which are then put to voters. The current Commission has proposed changes around housing – such as creating a fast track for affordable housing and establishing an affordable housing appeals board – and elections.
These are not Robert Moses levels of ‘getting stuff done’ and urban governance challenges certainly still exist. But – with the notable exception of the Congestion Charge – NYC appears capable of more innovative policy and reform than London.
London’s spatial plan is now working to “frustrate rather than facilitate the delivery of new homes”, its scrutiny body (the London Assembly) is underpowered, and “substantial practical challenges” apparently exist with pedestrianising one of Europe’s busiest streets. Why is this?
One reason is certainly the greater fiscal power NYC possesses. NYC relies on Washington for a low percentage of its overall budget whereas London relies on Westminster for almost three quarters of its budget. Consequently, NYC has more latitude to finance and iterate policy experiments from its own tax base. Meanwhile the GLA must not only navigate London’s veto players but also secure buy-in from the ultimate purse-string holders in central government – slowing decision making and worsening the city’s ‘ungovernability’.
Another potential reason is that NYC’s urban governance is older than London’s. NYC’s basic governance framework – comprising the mayor, council and five boroughs – has been established since 1898. London’s modern local government tier is comparatively young: the current boroughs date back to the 1960s and the GLA has only just turned twenty-five years old.
NYC has consequently had longer to adapt to and embrace the intrinsic ‘messiness’ of urban governance than London. Multiple vetoes exist, but there are also multiple channels to enact change: city legislation, mayoral input, agency and authority decisions, and charter revisions to name just a few. Actors are accustomed to assembling coalitions across these channels and practicing the art of heresthetic. In contrast, policy in London takes place through a more limited number of formal routes – putting a brake on change when resistance is encountered since few workarounds exist. NYC has already figured out how to enact change while London is still finding its way.
Change is slowly coming to London. Informal sub-regional partnerships are emerging and engagement between the boroughs and the GLA is increasing. These trends must continue, with London further embracing the ‘messiness’ of twenty-first century urban governance, alongside any necessary structural reforms.
Greater fiscal and policy devolution to London is clearly necessary. But this will be insufficient if the underlying urban governance model and culture cannot effectively operationalise this power.